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a b s t r a c t
Sir Francis Galton (Galton, 1907) conjectured the psychological process of magnitude estimation caused
the curious distribution of judgments he observed at Plymouth in 1906. However, after he published
Vox Populi, researchers narrowed their attention to the first moment of judgment distributions and its
often remarkable alignment with the truth, while it became customary to explain this wisdom of crowds
effect using ideas of statistics more than psychology, and without considering possible interactions
with other distribution moments. Recently, however, an exploration of the cognitive foundation of
judgment distributionswas published (Nash, 2014). The study not only formalized a possible link between
signal detection, evidence accumulation, and the shape of judgment distributions, but also in so doing,
conjectured that magnitude estimation by independent individuals causes a systematic error in the
wisdom of crowds indicated by judgment distribution skewness. The present study reports findings
from an experiment on magnitude estimation and supports these predictions. The study moreover
demonstrates that systematic errors by groups of people can be corrected using information about the
judgment distribution these people together form, before errors might cause damage to decision making.
In concluding, we revisit Galton’s data from the West of England Fat Stock and Poultry Exhibition in light
of what we have discovered.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
E-mail address: uwn@sam.sdu.dk.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2017.01.001
0022-2496/© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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1. Introduction
As individuals, our judgments of magnitude are often wrong
in the particular, but the mean of guesses by many individuals
about something (Galton, 1907b), or even the average of many
judgments by one individual about something (Vul & Pashler,
2008), is often remarkably accurate and precise for reasons of
probability. Particular judgments are subject to error, but when
errors scatter in equal proportion around the truth, the mean
is an accurate measurement of things in the world around us.
In fact, when every error of underestimation has an equivalent
counterpart error of overestimation, the mean judgment is valid
and reliable. This phenomenon has been called many things, from
Vox Populi (Galton, 1907b) to Rational Expectations (Muth, 1961),
to the Many Wrongs Principle (Simons, 2004). Most recently
it became known to the general public as Wisdom of Crowds
(Surowiecki, 2004).
How the brain harnesses laws of probability to facilitate the
wisdom of crowds remains unclear, although we have long sus-
pected the brain itself is probabilistic (Brunswik, 1943; Laplace,
1812), not least becauseweobserve it generating various estimates
of the same presented stimulus (Faisal, Selen, & Wolpert, 2008;
Luce & Mo, 1965; Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006). We know more
about how social mechanisms undermine the mean by turning in-
dependent judgments dependent (Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, &
Helbing, 2011; Muchnik, Aral, & Taylor, 2013), but when it comes
to explaining independent judgments, we hit an obstacle. Our pri-
mary models describe the result of thinking without reference to
the cognitive mechanisms that generate these outcomes (Griffiths,
Chater, Norris, & Pouget, 2012;Hoffman, 1960).Without an explicit
link to the cognitive processes that generate independent judg-
ments, we cannot move beyond statistics to explain collective er-
rors that occur even before crowds are swayed by social forces.
It was recently argued (Nash, 2014) that crowds of independent
people make errors of judgment, which are signaled by skewness
in the judgment distributions they together form. The argument
went beyond the macroscopic level of statistics by offering
explanations relating to psychophysical effects at the mesoscopic
level, and evidence accumulation following signal detection at the
microscopic level of the brain. These explanations were harvested
from an augmented version of the Quincunx, the statistical device
Sir Francis Galton built in 1873 to demonstrate the Central Limit
Theorem (Galton, 1894). Fromassumptions about the environment
and the cognitive system, the AQ emerges as an elegant model
of norm-based coding (Kayaert, Biederman, Op De Beeck, &
Vogels, 2005; Leopold, Bondar, & Giese, 2006; Loffler, Yourganov,
Wilkinson, & Wilson, 2005; Rhodes et al., 2005), signal detection
(Britten, Shadlen, Newsome, & Movshon, 1992; Newsome, Britten,
& Anthony Movshon, 1989), and evidence accumulation (Latimer,
Yates, Meister, Huk, & Pillow, 2015; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001;
Yang & Shadlen, 2007), and becomes a probabilistic computer of
judgments.
Galton plays an important role in this research article. Besides
inventing the original Quincunx, it was Galton who wrote the
seminal paper on the wisdom of crowds (Galton, 1907b) and
speculated that psychophysicists held the key to explaining his
observations. Galton was intrigued by the curious distribution of
magnitude estimates he uncovered at Plymouth and speculated
about the mental methods that caused it. However, Galton’s idea
that judgment distributions convey information about cognitive
processes has received little attention since, although an early
exception was Brunswik’s (1956) independent work on the
cognitive continuum and his examination of error distributions
produced by intuition versus analysis. One reason why few
have studied judgment distributions to develop theories about
cognition could be the success of paramorphic methods (Hoffman,
1960), or equivalently, what Marr (1982) referred to as studies
of the cognitive system at the computational level. Researchers
since Galton have developed highly accurate predictions about
magnitude estimation, without needing to model how the brain
generates fine-grained measurements about the world around
it. In particular, regression and Bayesian methods have been
successful in this regard.
Had competitors at the West of England Fat Stock and Poultry
Exhibition been required to discriminate between the weight of
two oxen, as opposed to guessing the precise weight of one,
then any question Galton might have posed about cognitive
mechanisms would almost certainly have been answered sooner.
Indeed, contemporary scientists are relatively knowledgeable
about the mechanism used by cognitive systems to discriminate
between two magnitudes.
Unlike contemporary studies of precise magnitude estimation,
contemporary studies of magnitude discrimination are commonly
carried out at what Marr (1982) called the algorithmic level.
In particular, sequential sampling models have been argued
to capture the essence of an important subset of human
cognitive mechanisms to provide accurate predictions about
another significant distribution in cognitive psychology, namely
the distribution of time taken by individuals to choose between
possible responses.
A connection between the cognitive processes of magnitude
estimation and discrimination may exist, but probing the connec-
tion is not our purpose here. Rather, we aim to suggest that se-
quential sampling and the wisdom of crowds are linked through
magnitude estimation, and along the way, explain why current
sequential sampling models of magnitude discrimination cannot
readily predict that link. We begin by clarifying what sequential
sampling models are, compare the most important of these, and
explain their confinement to coarse-grained problems of binary
choice. We subsequently introduce the AQ model in detail and
highlight why it, on the other hand, can readily be applied to the
fine-grained problem of estimation. Having done that, we present
predictions by the AQ and report findings from an experiment on
magnitude estimation that provides good support. Most impor-
tantly, the study demonstrates that systematic errors by groups
of people can be corrected using information about the judgment
distribution these people together form, before errors might cause
damage to decisionmaking. In concluding, we revisit Galton’s data
from the West of England Fat Stock and Poultry Exhibition in light
of what we have discovered.
2. Sequential sampling and the problem of discrimination
When applied to questions of perception, sequential sampling
models make fundamental assumptions about the environment
on the one hand, and the cognitive system on the other. About
the former, the environment is assumed to signal its state,
while about the latter, cognitive systems are assumed to sample
information sequentially from signals to generate evidence about
the environment,which the systemaccumulates to reduce surprise
quickly. As pointed out by Forstmann, Ratcliff, and Wagenmakers
(2016), sequential sampling is not simply governed by the
availability of signals but is an unavoidable consequence of the
cognitive system’s inability to process all available information
immediately. In other words, sequential sampling is thought to be
a defining characteristic of imperfect cognitive systems.
Another premise relating to the limitation of cognitive systems
concerns the accuracy of evidence these systems generate from
signals. Somewhere in the process, there are sources of error
relating to Thurston’s (1927) idea of discriminal dispersion,
according to which the effect of signals on the cognitive system
is probabilistic. The mathematical representation of errors by
U.W. Nash / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 77 (2017) 165–179 167
different sequential models comprise some of their most defining
characteristics and serve as logical guidelines for creating subsets
within the family. Accordingly, there are two primary subsets of
sequential samplingmodels, namelymodels that assume cognitive
systems accumulate absolute evidence for alternative hypotheses,
and models that assume cognitive system accumulate relative
evidence in favor of one hypothesis over another.
2.1. The Recruitment Model
The RecruitmentModel invented by LaBerge (1962) is the earli-
est example of models that assume cognitive systems accumulate
absolute evidence for alternative hypotheses. The model, which
LaBerge used to explain the problem of choosing the most in-
tense source of light, is also an exception compared with other se-
quential sampling models, because LaBerge assumes signals have
structure, comprising finite cues linked to alternative responses.
Depending on the objective difference between the intensity of
light from different sources, and depending on subjective charac-
teristics, the relative proportion of cues indicating the most in-
tense source varies, with greater differences in brightness, and
greater conditioning, increasing the relative proportion of cues for
the brightest source. The cognitive system is assumed to sample at
random with replacement from these cues, count the number of
cues encountered for each source, and select the light associated
with the counter first reaching a decision threshold.
2.2. The Accumulator Model
The Accumulator Model invented by Vickers (1970) is similar
to the Recruitment Model. Vickers explained his model using the
example of an environment that signals the length of two lines. The
problem for the cognitive system is to select the longest of these,
given limitations that cause its perception of length to be described
well by twoGaussiandistributions, one for each line. The difference
between the means of these distributions faultlessly indicates the
greater length in the absence of variance, but variance is assumed
to cause the cognitive system to perceive the smaller magnitude as
greater with positive probability, as it samples from the stimulus
in discrete time. As a consequence, the cognitive system can
either process each sample correctly or incorrectly. Of course, the
cognitive system is not assumed to know the precise details of
that, but is assumed to accumulate its degree of evidence for each
response using two separate counters that change variably, but
monotonically, toward the same threshold. Once this threshold is
reached, the organism responds in accordance with the winning
counter.
2.3. Poisson counter model
When the spread between the means of the Gaussian distribu-
tions is greater in theAccumulatorModel, orwhen the relative pro-
portion of informative cues is greater in the Recruitment Model,
one counter increasesmore rapidly in absolute terms, and compar-
atively. Counters are, in otherwords, negatively correlated in these
models. Pike’s (1973) contribution, which Townsend and Ashby
(1983) generalized, was to introduce counters driven by indepen-
dent processes in continuous time. More specifically, the differ-
ence between physical magnitudes, such as light intensities or line
lengths, is assumed to govern the duration between discrete in-
creases in evidence for each response. Because these durations are
assumed to be exponentially distributed, Poisson processes govern
the accumulation of evidence toward the decision threshold and
explain why the model has become known as the Poisson Counter
Model.
2.4. The Diffusion Model
Among current sequential sampling models, the Diffusion
Model invented by Ratcliff (1978) provides the greatest contrast to
the Recruitment Model, the Accumulator Model, and the Poisson
Counter Model. Its name derives from the basic assumption that
cognitive systems accumulate evidence in such negligible bundles
that Wiener diffusion characterizes the process well. In pure
form (Bitzer, Park, Blankenburg, & Kiebel, 2014), Wiener diffusion
is time-continuous and characterized by independent Gaussian
increments with a mean of v1t and a variance of t1s2, where t
denotes time, v is drift, and s captures the amount of diffusion.
When v is different from zero, the process tends to drift away from
where it starts, z, moving with variance in one particular direction
on average, except for the situation s = 0, where the process is
deterministic.
This single counter depiction of evidence accumulation is what
sets the Diffusion Model apart. As with most other sequential
models, the idea of discriminal dispersion forms the basis of
the accumulation process, but unlike the other models, the
information gathered for opposing hypotheses has opposite signs
and is accumulated by the same counter, which drifts upward
toward the decision threshold for one hypothesis, or downward
towards the other.More specifically, the average rate of drift occurs
in accordancewith the difference between themean signal emitted
by the environment for one hypothesis, and the mean signal
emitted by the environment for the alternative, in proportion to
their combined variances (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). The Diffusion
Model thereby links to signal detection theory (Green & Swets,
1966) through the sensitivity index.
3. Sequential sampling and the problem of estimation
Researchers view sequential sampling models with growing
interest for numerous reasons. First, sequential sampling models
do an excellent job predicting highly regular empirical patterns
relating to binary choice. These include simple predictions like
shorter mean response times (RT) for easier problems, but also
less obvious patterns, including longer mean RT for errors than
for correct responses, positively skewed RT distributions, where
the degree of skewness increases with task difficulty, and linear
(Wagenmakers & Brown, 2007), or almost linear (Green & Luce,
1971), correlation between the mean and variance of RT. Second,
sequential sampling models operate at the algorithmic level of
analysis, and thereby offer basic propositions about the cognitive
processes that cause outcomes, as opposed to only predictingwhat
these outcomes are. Finally, there is growing evidence to suggest
these proposals have solid neurophysiological foundations with
regard to both signal detection (Britten et al., 1992; Newsome et al.,
1989) and evidence accumulation (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Roitman
& Shadlen, 2002; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Yang & Shadlen,
2007). Indeed, results from neuroscience dovetail nicely with
current sequential sampling models as pointed out recently by
Ratcliff and his colleagues (Forstmann et al., 2016). Nevertheless,
as models of magnitude estimation, the Recruitment Model, the
Accumulator Model, the Poisson Counter Model, and the Diffusion
Model, share one critical limitation.
Current sequential sampling models have no counter for the
objective properties of signals and cannot, therefore, be used
to examine questions about error on the fine-grained scale of
estimation. The point is most easily appreciated with reference
to the Diffusion Model. While the slope of evidence accumulation
predicted by the Diffusion Model indicates the state of the
environment unambiguously in binary terms, deviations from the
slope are not equivalent to deviations from the sum of signals
at any moment in time, because the average rate of drift is
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determined by the sensitivity index,which is affected by subjective
uncertainty and is, therefore, more or less detached from objective
properties of the environment. In contrast, by clearly separating
the objective properties of the environment, on the one hand, from
the subjective properties of the cognitive system, on the other, the
AQ avoids this caveat.
3.1. Assumptions of the AQ
The AQ relates to the question of perception and shares basic
assumptions with most sequential models about the environment
and the cognitive system. Along key dimensions, however, the AQ
is unique. Most notable is the accumulation of signals, but also
the way cognitive systems are assumed to generate evidence is
innovative, yet inspired by findings in neuroscience.
3.1.1. The environment
The environment of the cognitive system is assumed to be char-
acterized by C discrete physical structures that signal information.
These structures are system elements and the information they
signal relate to an objective property, D, of the system. Moreover,
across elements, signals about the objective property may conflict.
For example, an exhibited item of livestock (the system) can have
fully developed horns (one element), but also low height (another
element). The first element signals greater weight (the objective
property of the system),whereas lowheight indicates the opposite.
Elements signal the objective property of the system perfectly
when summed correctly,
C
j=1 Cj, butmore importantly for limited
cognitive system, as we shall see, they also signal the objective
property when their deviation from the corresponding mean
element is accumulated,
D− D¯ =
C
j=1
(Cj − C¯j), (1)
where C¯j is the mean value of the j’th element of the system, and D¯
is the mean value of the objective property across the population
of common systems. Finally, and defining for the AQ model, the
environment is simplified by the assumption Cj − C¯j = ±v, where
v is constant and serves the purpose of bringing estimates onto the
appropriate scale.
3.1.2. The cognitive system
Although the environment is assumed to signal its objective
property faultlessly, the cognitive system has imperfections that
affect how precisely it gathers evidence from the signals available.
More specifically, we invoke the characteristic assumption that
restrictions on information processing force cognitive systems to
attend physical elements of the environment sequentially. On the
cognitive side, we refer to these physical elements as proximal
cues (Brunswik, 1943; Tolman & Brunswik, 1935), and in the
descriptive words of Tolman and Brunswik (1935) note they
serve as ‘‘local representatives’’ for the objective property of the
environment, which the cognitive systemmust appraise. Proximal
cues, however, are imperfect substitutes for the objective property,
not because the environment has important levels of fundamental
uncertainty, but because the cognitive system introduces noise in
gathering evidence from an environment that can, in principle, be
measured perfectly with the right device.
The assumption about how the cognitive system introduces
noise is inspired by Helson’s (1947) Adaptation Level Theory, and
findings of Norm-Based coding (Rhodes et al., 2005) in neuro-
science, as now explained. With reference to the Central Ten-
dency of Judgment (Hollingworth, 1910), Helson (1947) argued
that whenever cognitive systems judge, their computation is not
absolute, but relates to their adaptation level, which Helson de-
fined as ‘‘stimulus representing the pooled effect of all the stim-
uli to which the organism may be said to be attuned and which
brings forth responses such as indifferent, neutral, doubtful, equal,
or the like’’. The idea corresponds with Luce’s (1972) view that
although humans are, among other things, measuring devices,
psychophysicalmeasures do not exhibit any fixed relation to phys-
ical measures. Indeed, Helson’s theory, combined with established
views about cognitive limitations, suggests that variable coupling
between physical magnitudes, and estimates about these by the
cognitive system, serves the purpose of parsimony.
Because cognitive systems are unable to process the enormous
quantities of information the environment continuously broad-
casts, an alternative strategy that can, nevertheless, permit the
cognitive system to reduce surprise significantly, is to presume
stimulus corresponds to the average of prior experience, or the
‘‘norm’’. This strategy works because the presented stimulus in-
deed often will be near this level, particularly when experience is
substantial, and the statistical properties of the environment are
stable. Of course, the presented stimulus may sometimes deviate
by some important degree from the norm, and the cognitive sys-
tem invests precious resources well by sampling information se-
quentially fromproximal cues towager howunusual the presented
stimulus is overall.
Helson (1947) conjectured that adaptation levels are universal
in processes of perception, and numerous psychophysical studies
(Berniker, Voss, & Kording, 2010; Morgan, Watamaniuk, &
McKee, 2000) support this claim by demonstrating that humans
are remarkably good at computing and updating the average
of sensory attributes, including size, shape, and numerosity.
Moreover, at the neuronal level, Helson’s idea (Helson, 1947) that
responses are gradients from level has been supported by the
discovery of what appears to be Norm-Based coding in the visual
cortex to discriminate shapes and faces (Leopold et al., 2006;
Loffler et al., 2005; Rhodes et al., 2005), and in the auditory cortex
to discriminate sounds (Latinus, McAleer, Bestelmeyer, & Belin,
2013).
According to the theorized mechanism, the responses of two
pools of neurons interact to code deviations of presented stimulus
from the norm. More specifically, one of these pools responds
with increasing intensity to greater magnitudes, while the other
pool responds with decreasing intensity. Given this X-shaped
arrangement, response intensities cross at somemagnitude, which
researchers (Rhodes et al., 2005) believe corresponds to the
average of prior stimulus. These ideas are captured by Fig. 1, which
shows the Norm-Based coding model introduced by Rhodes and
her colleagues (Rhodes et al., 2005).
The Norm-Based coding model builds on the assumption that
neurons generate evidence about the deviation between the
presented stimuli, and the adaptation level, through competition.
The AQ uses that idea and combines the premise with the
principle of sequential sampling, to suggest that noise enters the
latter process due to characteristics of the competitive process.
Specifically, noise is assumed to enter the process of sequential
sampling because neurons, which compete to define attended
proximal cues relative their statistical norms, respond to cues with
variance. The statistical properties of the environment are assumed
to be still, and the cognitive system is assumed to have discovered
D¯ and C¯j in (1). To estimate D, the cognitive system attends each Cj
sequentially, comparing each Cj to the corresponding C¯j. For each
Cj attended, however, response variance among the competing
pools of neurons creates the possibility that neurons supporting
the idea Cj < C¯j will respond with least intensity although Cj < C¯j,
and neurons supporting the idea Cj > C¯j will respond with least
intensity although Cj > C¯j. Because neural competition is assumed
won through greatest response, both cases result in the wrong
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Fig. 1. The Norm-Based coding model: The Norm-Based coding model was
introduced by Rhodes (Rhodes et al., 2005) and her colleagues to explain how
the visual system discriminates between different faces. The proposed mechanism
involves opponent coding, whereby competition between two pools of neurons has
the function of coding deviations in magnitudes above and below the norm, such,
for example, the size of eyes compared with average size. One pool supports the
hypothesis ‘‘Smaller’’ by increasing its mean response with smaller magnitudes,
whereas the other pool supports ‘‘Greater’’ by increasing its mean response with
greater magnitudes; the norm is located at the cross-over of the consequent
X-shaped relationship. The right to code magnitudes in agreement with their
preference is won by the pool that displays the greatest response. However, due
to variance in neuronal responses, the outcomes of competition may not reflect the
objective properties of the stimulus. TheAQbuilds on thismechanismand combines
it with the principle of sequential sampling. C competitions are assumed to occur in
sequence, each involving the discrimination of particular proximal cues from their
norm, and each generating discrete evidence of±v depending on which pool wins.
This evidence is accumulated concurrently, and once all proximal cues have been
processed, provides an estimate of the magnitude of deviation between an overall
objective property and its norm. Error in the outcome of the neuronal competition,
as captured by p in the AQ, is thereby assumed to cause errors in the generation of
evidence, but the accumulation of the possibly faulty evidence is assumed to occur
without mishap.
detection of Cj and cause an increase in the weight of evidence by
+vwhen the appropriate incremental change is−v, and vice versa.
The probability of any particular cue being detected correctly is
denoted by p, such that incorrect detection is given by 1 − p. Of
course, whenever p = 1, the accumulation of evidence results in
magnitude estimates perfectly aligned with D. Indeed, under this
special condition, the evolution of gathered evidence corresponds
perfectly to the sequence of signals provided by the environment.
Bymodeling errors between the evidence cognitive systems gather
from proximal cues, and the signals the environment emits, the AQ
thereby depicts not only the sequential accumulation of sensory
evidence but also captures the sequential accumulation of sensory
errors, which is essential for studying errors at the fine-grained
level of estimation.
4. Deriving the AQ
Given the assumption stated above, the process of attending
cues and gathering evidence distills to the random variable ed. This
random variable captures the probabilistic estimate of deviation
betweenD and D¯ in (1) by one cognitive system.Multiple estimates
by the same individual, or single estimates by many individuals
endowed with the same p, results in one particular distribution
of judgments that depends on C , v, and the relation between D
and D¯. Here we explain how to derive the mean, variance, and
skew of this distribution by following an intuitive procedure based
on familiar properties of Binomial distributions. These moments
become pivotal to our predictions about the wisdom of crowds.
The AQ mechanism
Two sequences of C opposing outcomes characterize the AQ
mechanism. The first sequence is deterministic while the second
links to the first probabilistically. To underline the lineage between
Galton’s original Quincunx and the AQ, let us refer to the determin-
istic sequence as the ‘‘attractor ball’’ and the probabilistic sequence
as the ‘‘chaser ball’’ (Fig. 2).
The probability that any outcome in the chaser ball sequence
aligns with the corresponding outcome in the attractor ball
sequence is given by p. When p = 1, all outcomes align, whereas
the occurrence of any alignment is purely chance when p = 0.5.
Between these extremes the two sequences correlate more or less.
Let us focus on the chaser ball sequence and assume it con-
sists of the opposing outcomes ‘‘smaller’’ or ‘‘greater’’. Nowwe split
each outcome of ‘‘smaller’’ or ‘‘greater’’ into ‘‘hit’’ or ‘‘miss’’, which
permits us to decompose the chaser ball sequence into four Bino-
mial random variables as shown below. Here S and G symbolize
‘‘smaller’’ and ‘‘greater’’ outcomes respectively while dot indicates
misalignment with the attractor ball.
Smaller Greater
Hit S ∼ Bin(nS, p) G ∼ Bin(nG, p)
Miss S˙ ∼ Bin(nS, 1− p) G˙ ∼ Bin(nG, 1− p)
Accumulation of unit outcomes
Next let us assume each outcome is weighted by v, but let us
start with v = 1 for simplicity. This permits us to describe the
chaser ball, that is to say, the accumulation of perceived differences
between D and D¯, by the sum of Binomial variables
ed = ([S + S˙] − [G+ G˙]), (2)
where the first bracket accumulates the sumof ‘‘smaller’’ outcomes
and the second bracket accumulates the sum of ‘‘greater’’
outcomes.
Next we must enforce the constraint of nS + nG = C . To do that
we first reformulate (2) as
ed = ([S − G˙] + [S˙ − G]) (3)
and substitute nS − S for G˙ and nG − S˙ for G to give
ed = ([S − (nS − S)] + [S˙ − (nG − S˙)]). (4)
Then we restate (4) as
ed = 2S + 2S˙ − (nS + nG), (5)
and finally constrain (5) by substituting C for nS + nG to give
ed = 2S + 2S˙ − C . (6)
Accumulation of outcomes more generally
Having demonstrated the basic procedure of accumulating unit
outcomes in the chaser ball sequence, we nowease the assumption
v = 1. That is done by multiplying each part of (6) by v to give
ed = v2S + v2S˙ − vC . (7)
Accounting for the attractor ball
Finally, let us define t as the number of ‘‘greater’’ outcomes
minus the number of ‘‘smaller’’ outcomes, which the attractor
ball sequence contains. The number of ‘‘smaller’’ and ‘‘greater’’
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Fig. 2. The Augmented Quincunx (AQ): The AQ is characterized by its mechanism, which consists of two sequences of C binary outcomes, where the first sequence is
deterministic and the second is linked probabilistically to the first through the probability p.When p = 1 every outcome in the second sequence alignswith the corresponding
outcome in the first sequence, whereas any alignment is chance when p = 0.5. Between these values the two sequences correlate more or less. If the possible outcomes in
each sequence are assigned constant values of v and−v respectively, and if the actual outcomes in each sequence are accumulated sequentially, then an augmented version
of Galton’s Quincunx is obtained, where a ‘‘chaser ball’’ – the accumulation of the second sequence – moves around displaced rows of pins in pursuit of an ‘‘attractor ball’’ –
the accumulation of the first sequence – to land in one of C + 1 compartments. When the AQ is used as a probabilistic computer of judgments, each left or right movement
around pins captures the outcome of signal detection regarding the magnitude of a structure of the environment relative to its average while the entire path traced by the
chaser ball captures a probabilistic judgment, ed , about the deviation of an overall structure to its norm. The path of the attractor ball, on the other hand, captures the sum of
signals, which is assumed to equal the actual deviation to the norm. These principles are broadly consistent with observations about evidence generation and accumulation
by competing populations of neurons engaged in norm-based coding.
outcomes is consequently governed by the combination of t and
the sequence length C . Specifically, it can be shown that
nS = 12 (C− t) and nG =
1
2
(C+ t), (8)
where nS and nG are strictly integers, since (un)even values of C
occur with (un)even values of t . For example, only t = −1 or t = 1
may occur when C = 1, while t = −2, t = 0 or t = 2 may occur
when C = 2.
The mean, variance, skew, and kurtosis of ed
After substituting 12 (C− t) for S and S˙ in (7), themean, variance,
skew and kurtosis of ed can be computed, as shown in Supplement
I, using rules for summing independent Binomial distributions:
µ = (2p− 1)tv (9)
σ 2 = 4C(1− p)pv2 (10)
γ = − 2µ
Cσ
(11)
κ = 3+ 4v
2
σ 2
− 6
C
. (12)
Beforewe proceed, the readermaywish to pay special attention
to the following notes:
• The count of instances where Cj > C¯j minus the count of
instances where Cj < C¯j in (1) is equivalent to t .
• D − D¯ in (1) is equivalent to tv as v converts the net count of
deviations to evidence on the appropriate scale.
• The random variable ed is the estimate of D − D¯, not D. The
individual must add D¯ and ed to estimate D.
• We denote tv by d in the following exposition to indicate the
relation between tv and ed clearly.
• We use subscripts for p, and variables related to p, in the
following whenever heterogeneity is important. Otherwise
p is used without subscript with the understanding that
specific predictions relate to both a crowd of homogeneous
individuals, or the crowd within (Vul & Pashler, 2008) as one
individual makes numerous estimates under constant stimulus
conditions.
5. Magnitude estimation and the wisdom of crowds
Having positioned the AQ model clearly among current
sequential sampling models, explained its assumptions in detail,
and having explained the AQmechanismmathematically, we have
the basis for examining the system of predictions the AQ makes
about magnitude estimation by individuals, and crowds. We start
by focusing on what the AQ predicts about the phenomenon
most suggestive of probabilistic thinking, namely trial-to-trial
variability.
5.1. Trial-to-trial variability and the origin of noise
The observation that an individual may respond differently on
separate occasionswhen physical stimulus conditions are identical
is not only one of the most significant findings in psychology and
neuroscience, but also one of the most debated (Faisal et al., 2008).
Brunton, Botvinick, and Brody (2013) recently argued the origin of
variability has never been determined, but they concluded based
on their experiments that whereas humans and rats appear to
accumulate evidence without error, the generation of evidence is
subject to noise. The AQ is consistent with this finding.
The AQ predicts that trial-to-trial variability in magnitude esti-
mation arises from random errors at the level of signal detection,
as captured by 1− p, whereas the subsequent accumulation of ev-
idence occurs faultlessly. What Eqs. (9), (10), and (11) also predict,
however, is that trial-to-trial variability is highly intricate. Indeed,
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predictions presented in this paper suggest thatmodeling the prin-
ciples governing trial-to-trial variability must be done in order to
understand the systemof effects that response variability can have,
for one individual across trials, or for crowds of people exposed to
the same physical condition once.
5.2. The central tendency of judgment and wisdom of crowds
While trial-to-trial variability relates to the response of
individuals when presented with constant stimulus conditions,
Hollingworth (1910) and later Stevens and Greenbaum (1966)
observed what appears to be unrelated patterns of responses by
individuals across variable stimulus conditions. The AQ, however,
predicts not only a connection between these phenomena, but also
suggests their combined effect is essential for understanding the
wisdom of crowds.
What Hollingworth and Stevens observed was that when in-
dividuals make estimates of magnitude, their judgments of stim-
ulus positioned at the mean of experience are valid, whereas
individuals underestimate stimulus above this point, and overes-
timate stimulus below. Hollingworth called the phenomenon the
‘‘central tendency of judgment’’ and we use that name here as op-
posed to Stevens’ ‘‘regression effect’’ because ‘‘central tendency’’ is
most suggestive of the underlying adaptation level.
The AQ predicts the central tendency of judgments, and
explains its occurrence as follows: Given considerable experience
with particular systems in the environment, an individual has
adapted to the population mean of these systems, and consistent
with norm-based coding, her subsequent judgments of magnitude
are estimates of deviation from this level, d = 0. In the absence of
evidence besides that retrieved from her memory, the individual
presumes the stimulus presented to her is prototypical, such that
ed = 0. Her subsequent processing of sensory cues, however,
causes her to make sequential adjustments by−v or v as she finds
evidence suggesting otherwise. Insofar d = 0, cues suggest this
normality, and adjustments of −v and v will occur with equal
expected frequency. Her probabilistic estimates thereby become
valid independent of p when d = 0, because her errors of
overestimation andunderestimation are expected to occur in equal
frequency independent of her adeptness.
Now, unless the individual was exposed to adaptation level
stimulus many times, and her trial-to-trial variability was ob-
served, the validity of her judgments would go unnoticed. How-
ever, when an entire crowd of individuals with similar experience
eachmakes a single judgment about stimulus near their adaptation
level, we notice this remarkable phenomenon with many names,
which we choose to call the wisdom of crowds. Stated differently,
the probabilistic mechanism that causes trial-to-trial variability by
the individual is conjectured to be the cause of wisdom of crowds,
within one mind (Vul & Pashler, 2008), and across multiple cogni-
tive systems.
However, wisdom of the crowds is crucially dependent on the
environment too.When d ≠ 0, the number of cues consistent with
‘‘smaller’’ and ‘‘larger’’ will be disproportionate, thereby making
relevant the precision with which cues are processed. To illustrate
this most clearly, consider d at the margin of experience. Here all
cues are consistent with the same hypothesis, and the probability
of accurate estimation becomes p · p · · · · · p = pC . For p ≠ 1,
estimates thus become invalid, but more generally, the predicted
degree of judgment bias is d − (2p − 1)d, from which we notice
individuals are predicted to overestimate when d > 0 and
underestimate when d < 0, precisely as Hollingworth and Stevens
observed.
5.3. Heterogeneous rates of adjustment and judgment bias
Although the central tendency of judgments suggests all indi-
viduals, regardless of their ability to process information, make
valid judgments about adaptation level stimulus, findings (Cavo-
nius, Hilz, & Chapman, 1974; Cicchini, Arrighi, Cecchetti, Giusti,
& Burr, 2012) suggest persistent heterogeneity among individuals
in their judgment bias when presented with magnitudes different
from this norm. The AQ suggests the possibility of such differences,
and explains them by heterogeneity in pi among the population of
individuals, which creates diversity among people in their rate of
adjustment away from their prior belief of edi = 0 when d ≠ 0.
The extent of adjustment is captured by the judgment line, defined
as the relation between d and the expected value of edi . The slope
of the judgment line equals the derivative of (9) with respect to
d, which is 2pi − 1. From this we notice the expected value of edi
is invariant to d when pi = 0.5 while edi adjusts completely with
d when pi = 1.0. In the first case, the judgment line is horizon-
tal at edi = 0, while it extends from the origin at 45° in the sec-
ond. For 0.5 < pi < 1.0, the judgment line varies in slope while
judgments correspondingly vary in their expected bias. Common
for all lines, however, is their intersection at the adaptation level,
(d = 0, edi = 0).
For our later empirical purposes, the linearity between d and the
expected value of edi is useful. It facilitates the estimation of pi by
equating the slope of the estimated judgment line, βˆi, with 2pi−1,
and solving for pi. Performing this procedure yields
pˆi = βˆi + 12 (13)
where pˆ and βˆ indicate we are dealing with estimates of pi and βi
based on limited numbers of judgments, and subscript i indicates
the individual for whom the estimates are made. However, the re-
lation between pi and βi indicated by (13) may have even broader
interest. Eq. (13) proposes an answer to an important question re-
garding the use of linear regression modeling to simulate judg-
ment. Given that linear regression models are only paramorphic
representations of human judgment (Hoffman, 1960), yet simu-
late judgment so well it appears the brain actually performs re-
gression analysis, researchers (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) have
long wondered what mechanism causes that appearance. The AQ
suggests sequential sampling, involving noisy and accumulating
adjustments away from the point of averages, creates this effect.
Accordingly, βi is a computational level effect directly related to
the precision of signal detection at the algorithmic level.
5.4. Heterogeneous rates of adjustment and judgment reliability
Cicchini et al. (2012) not only reported that some individuals
persistently make less biased judgments of extreme stimulus, but
also reported the same people make judgments that are more
consistent. Stated differently, some people not only have judgment
lines that are more veridical, but their trial-to-trial variability
also is smaller than for another subset of individuals, whose
judgment lines are flatter and characterized by greater noise. These
patterns were predicted by Cicchini and his colleagues using a
Bayesian model with two key components. First, measurement
uncertainty was modeled using the likelihood function’s error
term, with greater error capturing greater uncertainty and making
the judgment line flatter, and second, white noise was added to
the mean of the likelihood function to remove the deterministic
mapping from prior to posterior and thereby induce trial-to-trial-
variability.
Like the Bayesian model used by Cicchini and his colleagues,
the AQ also predicts that less biased judges are more consistent,
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but unlike this Bayesian model, the AQ makes the prediction
by generating the distribution of responses endogenously. The
prediction is found by simply substituting (13) into variance
equation (10) to yield
σ 2i = Cv2

1− β2i

, (14)
which approaches 0 as βi approaches 1, or equivalently, as signal
detection errors approach 0.
5.5. Judgment distribution skewness and error by the mean
Let us finally shift our focus to the question of judgment distri-
bution skewness (JDS). Suppose one individual makes numerous
magnitude estimates about one particular objective property ac-
cording to the AQ mechanism, or alternatively, that many individ-
uals with homogeneous ability to process information make one
estimate each about the property according to the same principles.
In either case estimateswill be distributed around themean, unless
p = 1, where no variance exists.
Let us define error, ϵ, in themost commonway by the difference
between the objective property, d, and the mean of judgments,
ϵ = d− (2p− 1)d (15)
and solve (15) for d to give
d = ϵ
2(1− p) . (16)
By substituting (16) into skew equation (11) via mean equation
(11), while remembering tv = d, we can solve for ϵ and obtain the
prediction that JDS and ϵ are correlated, as indicated by the linear
equation
ϵ = −Cσ(1− p)
2p− 1 γ . (17)
Finally, we can relate Eq. (17) to the slope of the individual’s
judgment line for empirical purposes by substituting (13) into (17)
to obtain
ϵ = −Cσ(1− βˆ)
2βˆ
γ . (18)
What Eqs. (17) and (18) reveal is that γ < 0 tends to occur
when ϵ > 0, whereas γ > 0 tends to occurwhen ϵ < 0.Moreover,
higher values of p andβ are predicted tomake the relation between
error and skewness flatter. In other words, as Nash (2014) pointed
out, the AQ not only predicts systematic error in the wisdom of
crowds depending on the relation between the objective property
being estimated and its norm, but also systematic error that is
signaled by JDS when people in the crowd process sensory cues
better than chance.
This latter prediction can best be understood by considering
that novices (p = 0.5) form symmetric judgment distributions
for all objective properties (see Eq. (11)). Consequently, JDS and ϵ
do not correlate for these individuals. In contrast, the more adept
the individuals are, themore skewed their judgment distribution is
predicted to be for d ≠ 0. On the other hand, adept judges also have
smaller ϵ, which suggests that while the signal of JDS is stronger
for them, the idea of correcting ϵ using JDS for very adept judges
may be limited by a trade-off between the potential reduction in
error and the signal that JDS provides. Indeed, this question ofwhat
level of p is most susceptible to error reduction using JDS is an
interesting one, but not one investigated here.
5.6. Group Size and Composition
As suggested above, Eqs. (17) and (18) are central to the idea
of correcting errors in the wisdom of crowds using the signal
provided by JDS. Quite clearly these equations suggest it might be
valuable to get hold of judgments by individuals about multiple
objective properties in the particular class, note the errors of the
mean judgments, along with information about JDS, and then
estimate (18) for the purpose of correcting the mean by its
expected error on subsequent occasions.
A couple of possible caveats, however, quickly come to mind.
First, Eq. (18) is based on the assumption that people are
homogeneous in their ability to generate sensory evidence. How
diversity, as for example reported by Cicchini et al. (2012), affects
the possibility of correcting errors using skewness, is therefore
unclear and requires some thought. Second, it can be argued
that actively discriminating between those individuals whose
judgments will be used to compute the mean, and those whose
judgments will not, is an alternative and more promising way
to secure better collective judgments (Goldstein, McAfee, & Suri,
2014) than skew-correcting errors by large unfiltered crowds.
After all, error equation (15) suggests that more adept judges
make smaller errors. On the other hand, Eq. (10) indicates the
benefit of aggregating estimates for all levels of p, except p =
1. In other words, the AQ suggests a trade-off between bias and
consistency thatmight be advantageously balanced. As it turns out,
however, finding the optimal threshold for ability in the presence
of heterogeneity does not compete with efforts to correct errors
using JDS. Rather, these efforts are complementary.
To see the argued complementarity, let us first determine that
finding an optimal threshold for ability is indeed an important
strategy for reducing ϵ according to the AQ.
Suppose a crowd of people with equal values of p are
considering if they should invite someone unlike themselves to
join. Following Cicchini and his colleagues (Cicchini et al., 2012)
who, it must be emphasized, examined individual judges, we
assume the crowd’s objective is to minimize the mean squared
error (MSE) of their democratic judgment, as given by mean
equation (9). Specifically, the crowd must compare the MSE it
currently produces, with the MSE it will produce if it accepts
an additional member, where MSE has the desirable quality of
being equal to bias plus inconsistency. For an individual, MSE is
simply σ 2 + ϵ2, but MSE for crowds must account for the number
of individuals who form the democratic judgment. The crowd’s
objective function is, therefore, the difference between the current
MSE given present crowd size, and the MSE experienced if the
crowd expands by one:
π =

Nσ 2g
N2
+ ϵ2g

−

Nσ 2g + σ 2i
(N + 1)2 + ϵ
2
g+i

, (19)
where subscripts g and i denote the group and the potential
member respectively, N denotes the current number of members,
ϵg = d − edg is the collective error of the crowd without the new
member, while ϵg+i = d − (Nedg + edi) 11+N is the collective error
of the crowd with the new member included.
It turns out the value of increasing the number of individuals in
the crowd is contingent on the deviation between the presented
objective property and its norm, with the benefit being greatest
when the objective property is stereotypical, holding other
variables constant. To see this, we first substitute (9) and (10) into
(19) and differentiate the obtained expressionwith respect to t and
obtain
tv2

8pg − 8pi
 
pg + pi + 2N

pg − 1
− 2
(1+ N)2 , (20)
which is 0 when t = 0. Next we simply follow the standard
procedure and further differentiate (20) to find the objective
function is maximized here, under the appropriate restrictions 1 >
pg > pi > 0.5, v > 0 and N > 0.
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Fig. 3. The basis for correcting systematic error in thewisdomof crowds: a. The AQ predicts that judgment distributions formed by peoplewith the same range of experience
scatter symmetrically around a shared adaptation level, d = 0, while individuals with different abilities to process information, as captured by p, form distributions with
different variances. b. When the presented stimulus is distinct from this norm, the AQ predicts that people with different ability adjust away from it at various rates and form
skewed judgment distributions, as captured by Eq. (11), with different and biased means, as captured by (15). When there are many subgroups of individuals in the crowd
with diverse abilities, the aggregate distribution fans out, with the sub-distribution formed by complete novices spreading symmetrically around adaptation level, while
sub-distributions produced by increasingly adept individuals are positioned closer to the objective property. The overall effect is the creation of an aggregate distribution
that is positively skewed when the objective property is larger than the norm, and negatively skewed when the objective property is smaller. Moreover, since the mean of
each sub-distribution adjusts incompletely with stimulus positioned away from the norm, the overall effect is a correlation between skewness in the aggregate distribution
and the error associated with its mean. In other words, although the aggregate level association between skewness and error is different from such correlation at the level
of sub-distributions, these correlations have the same sign. For this reason, the presence of diverse abilities among people in the crowd does not eliminate the possibility of
correcting errors using the signal that judgment distribution skewness provides. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to
the web version of this article.)
If membership to the crowd is binding, the decreasing
benefit of having an additional member may become particularly
problematic whenever the crowd faces unusual circumstances.
Indeed, someone who benefits the collective under normal
circumstances may be a liability for the collective when the
objective property is more extreme. However, suppose current
members realize this and demand knowledge of the minimum
requirement for their potential new addition. That is obtained by
setting t = 0 in (19), differentiating the derived equation with
respect to pi, and solving, to yield and expression for how adept
the potential member must be at minimum to be accepted, given
the number and adeptness of the current, homogeneousmembers:
pi∗ = 12

1+

pg(4pg − 4)+ pg(8pg − 8)N + N√
N

. (21)
The derivative of (21) with respect to N is positive and we
conclude that potential members must be more adept if they seek
acceptance to larger crowds. Indeed, an individual looking to form
a partnership should set the lowest hurdle of all. Setting (21) to
0.5 reveals that, under normal circumstances, even the most inept
individual should be accepted as partner unless the first person’s
level of adeptness surpasses pg = 0.908. On the other hand,
the crowd approaching infinite size should expand regardless of
the ineptness by their potential new member, unless the abilities
of current homogeneous members surpass pg = 0.854. Still,
threshold equation (21) also confirms that infallible judges derive
no benefit whatsoever from democratic judgment, as pi∗ = 1
when pg = 1 even at t = 0.
While membership is easiest at t = 0 where e¯d is unbiased,
the hurdle for acceptance rises dramatically once t ≠ 0. Indeed,
by letting t → ∞ in (19) and solving the resultant equation for
pi, we simply obtain pi∗ = pg . Stated differently, no crowd of
homogeneous individuals should accept someone with an ability
lower than their own when the objective property is infinitely
different from the norm, while pi∗ → pg for objective properties
approaching that level of abnormality.
In summary, the above predictions indicate that crowds with
too many, or too few members, can be formed, which confirms
the presence of an optimal crowd size and gives merit to the
strategy of actively discriminating between those individuals
whose judgments will be used to compute the mean, and those
whose judgments will not. What these predictions also suggest,
however, is that optimal crowd size is not constant, but depends
on current and available adeptness, and on how unusual stimulus
conditions are.
Since optimized crowds are predicted to consist of individuals
with diverse adeptness, except under extreme circumstances (d =
∞ or pg = 1), we must examine more closely what effect
this prediction has on the prospect of correcting ϵ using signals
provided by JDS; the prospectsmay be limited if diversity in ability
adds noise to the signal.
We proceed most simply by visual illustration. When the
adeptness of individuals in the crowd is diverse, the observed
distribution of judgments is an aggregate of sub-distributions
according to the AQ, each formed by groups of people with
particular values of p. For t = 0, these sub-distributions are
symmetric, and the aggregate distribution is, therefore, symmetric
too (Fig. 3(a)), while the mean of each distribution is unbiased as
observed from error equation (16). However, when t ≠ 0, sub-
distributions are predicted to fan-out, with the distribution formed
by the most adept judges being positioned farthest from the norm
towards the objective property, and the distribution formed by
novices remaining centered around this average value. That creates
an asymmetry in the overall distribution, which is distinct from,
but consistent with, the skewness also present in sub-distributions
under this condition (Fig. 3(b), red distribution). In other words,
the mean of the aggregate distribution is predicted to correlate
with error and skewness in the same general way as the means of
its sub-distributions. Moreover, the fanning-effect that causes the
aggregate level correlation is highly robust as we sequentially peel
away, so to speak, sub-distributions formed by the most novice
individuals, thereby suggesting the possibility of correcting errors
using JDS, even for smaller, wiser crowds.
6. Materials and methods
To examine predictions of the AQ, and if relevant, investigate
the possibility of correcting systematic collective error, thirty-two
undergraduate students from the University of Southern Denmark,
aged 22–33, were asked to participate in a simple experiment
(Fig. 4). Fifteen of the volunteers were female. One batch of 210
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Fig. 4. A simple experiment on magnitude estimation: Thirty-two volunteers were shown 210 digitally rendered circles in identical sequence, and were asked to estimate
the area of these. Feedback was given immediately after each judgment. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
red circles of various sizes was rendered on black backgrounds
and displayed sequentially in a single order on computermonitors,
with resolution of 1280 × 800, and frame rate of 59 Hz. The
circles’ pixel areas were drawn from a normal distribution with
a mean and standard deviation of 7764 and 2082 respectively,
and were reported in units of 100 pixels (H pixels). Participants
were seated at individual stations in one computer laboratory and
supervised by an employee of the university. Participants were
instructed to independently estimate the area of circles as they
appeared on their monitor. Each estimate had to be submitted
within 20 s, but could be disclosed at any moment inside this
constraint. Submissions were made using a mouse, a slider, and
a button. Upon submitting their estimate, participants received
immediate feedback about the actual area, alongwith their margin
of error. Pressing continue caused the next circle to be displayed,
and so on, until the participant had evaluated all 210.
7. Results
The following results are arranged in the same order as the
corresponding predictions were examined.
7.1. Participants displayed trial-to-trial variability
No participant faced the same circle multiple times. However,
when circle areas within 2.5 H pixels of each other are treated as
equal, 67 judgment distributions containing at least 10 judgments
can be formed for every participant. These numbers do not
correspond uniquely to the 210 circles, since judgments by an
individual are applied numerous times according to the followed
procedure. For example, across the circle area between 68.08
H pixels and 70.68 H pixels, there were 11 presented circles,
which were treated as one, thereby providing 11 judgments per
individual. Similarly, for the overlapping area 68.18 H pixels
to 71.03 pixels, 11 circles were bundled as one, creating 11
judgments, some of whichwere already used in the previous batch
of this rolling method.
Scattering the representative area, defined as the mean of the
particular bundle of areas, and the average variance of estimates
across participants for that bundle of areas (Fig. 5), reveals notice-
able estimate variability as predicted by the AQ in Section 5.1. Note
that dark blue dots in Fig. 5 capturemean tendencies across all par-
ticipants, while light blue dots show the variability of responses to
particular circle areas for each participants.
7.2. Participants adapted to the average presented area
Judgments by participants were regressed on all presented
areas to produce 32 judgment lines, one for each participant. For 31
of these, the 95% confidence interval included the estimate of 77.64
H pixels for thismagnitude. Data thereby supported the adaptation
level theory and predictions stated in Section 5.2.
7.3. Participants had different rates of adjustment and bias
Participants demonstrated differences in how accurately they
could estimate, with linear patterns of association between areas
and estimates revealing this heterogeneity. Patterns became
particularly clear by sorting participants into two groups according
toMSE and examining aggregate judgment lines. This is illustrated
by Fig. 6, where each point is a combination of the presented
magnitude and the associated judgment distributionmean, for the
particular group. OLS (F1−16 = 4233.85, p < 0.0001, F17−32 =
390.29, p < 0.0001) revealed noticeable differences between
βˆ1−16 and βˆ17−32 (Z = 15.71, p < 0.0001), providing support for
the prediction in Section 5.3 that people who share adaptation
levels may adjust away from this point at different rates
when presented with magnitudes towards the margins of their
experience, and may thereby display different levels of bias. Note
these patterns of results are robust to different ways of contrasting
top and bottom performers, as explained in Supplement I.
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Fig. 5. Skew and variance of judgment distributions formed by single individuals: a. Sixty-seven judgment distributions containing at least 10 judgments were formed
for each participant by treating circle areas within 2.5 H pixels of each other as equivalent. Light blue dots show combinations of circle areas and JDS for each participant,
while dark blue dots show the mean JDS across participants for these circles. For this arrangement of mean JDS and circle areas, OLS reveals statistically noticeable negative
association (F = 34.16, p = 0.0001). b. While participants responded with high variability to the same presented area, statistically noticeable differences in response
variability across the presented areas were not found (F = 1.02, p = 0.317). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the
web version of this article.)
Fig. 6. Judgment lines for subgroups of participants: a. Two groups of 16 participantswere formed based on theirMSE from judging the area of circles. Circleswere presented
in identical sequence and participantsmade their judgments independently. Shown are combinations of presented circle areas and themean of judgments across participants
in each group. Red points belong to the group of participants with the highest error. b. The slope of judgment lines for every participant was estimated using OLS and these
were subsequently converted to estimates of p in the AQ using Eq. (13). After setting C = 3 and v = 30, judgments of the magnitudes presented to participants were
generated in MATLAB for each estimated pi using moment equations (9)–(12) in a Pearson system. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
7.4. Less biased participants were more consistent
The variance of judgment line residuals for participants with
smallest MSE, and the variance of judgment line residuals for
participants with largest MSE, were tested for homogeneity. Based
on these two samples of 3360 residuals, Levene’s test indicated
unequal variances (F = 133.94, p < 0.0001). The standard
deviation of residuals in the wiser group was 15.43 H pixels,
while it was 24.03 H pixels in the other. Less biased individuals
are evidently more consistent too, as predicted by the AQ in
Section 5.4. As reported in Supplement I, these patterns of results
are robust to different ways of contrasting top and bottom
performers.
7.5. Judgment distributions of individualswere systematically skewed
Using the rolling procedure described in Section 7.1, computing
the average skewness across judgment distributions for each
representative circle area suggested that distributions of estimates
formed by individuals tended to have negative skew when the
judged area was greater than average, and positive skew when
the presented area was smaller than average (Fig. 5(a)). This key
finding (F = 34.16, p = 0.0001) is consistent with predictions in
Section 5.5.
7.6. CE is indicated by JDS
As predicted by the AQ in Section 5.5, the skewness of judgment
distributions formed by all thirty-two participants indicated the
degree and direction of CE. When the distribution of judgments
was negatively skewed, the mean tended to underestimate areas,
while it tended to overestimate whenever the skew was positive
(F1−32 = 55.89, p < 0.0001). Note the constant term of 2.13 H
pixels was significant (t = 3.40, p < 0.001), which suggests
slight overestimation by the mean judgment when the judgment
distribution is symmetric, which the AQ model does not capture.
However, as Supplement I indicates, the significance of the
constant term fluctuates across the different ways groups can be
formed to contrast adeptness, thus suggesting the inability of the
AQ to predict a significant constant is unproblematic.
7.7. The Slope of Association between JDS and CE is flatter for wiser
groups
Participants were again sorted according to MSE, and JDS was
regressedwith CE in both groups (Fig. 7). OLS provided an excellent
description (F1−16 = 4.48, p = 0.036; F17−32 = 41.09, p <
0.0001), while a noticeable difference between βγ1−16 and βγ17−32
was found (Z = −4.66, p < 0.0001), providing support for the
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Fig. 7. JDS and CE correlations for subgroups of participants: a. Two groups of 16 participants were again formed based on their MSE from judging the area of circles.
Shown are combinations of skewness for each judgment distribution formed by the groups across the 210 trials, and the error associated with the mean of judgments across
participants in each group. Red points belong to the group of participants with the highest error. b. Correlations generated by the AQ using moment equations (9)–(12) in a
Pearson system. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
prediction stated at the end of Section 5.5 that association between
CE and JDS is flatter when groups are wiser. These patterns of
results are robust to different ways of contrasting top and bottom
performers, as explained in Supplement I.
7.8. Groups can be too large or too small
Participant performance was evaluated using the root of MSE
(RMSE) over 209 trials, and the CE of subgroups containing the
highest N∗ performers was recorded on the final trial. There are
210 possible final trials, and the average RMSE of the mean judg-
ments in different sized elite subgroups for these trials revealed
that groups of all participants, or the top performer working alone,
underperformed groups containing an intermediate number of the
highest performing participants (Fig. 8(a), red line). The estimated
quadratic equation for RMSE, 5.43−0.20N∗+0.01N2∗ , isminimized
at N∗ = 11.77 (F = 288.74, p < 0.0001), revealing that harvest-
ing mean estimates across the eleven to twelve highest perform-
ing participants provide the greatest accuracy. The AQ predicts the
same general pattern based on 250 simulated experiments involv-
ing 32 agents, whose p’s were estimated from the judgment lines
of the participants using (13), particularly when v = 30 H pixels
and C = 3, or thereabouts. These patterns relate to predictions and
explanations provided in Section 5.6.
7.9. CE by the crowd, and by wiser subgroups, is correctable
The procedure described above was again followed, but this
time, when an elite group was formed before the last round, all
observations of JDS associated with this group on the previous
trials were regressed with CE to yield the model
D− µD = βγ · γ (22)
whereD is the presentedmagnitude in absolute terms andµD is the
mean of estimate about D. On the 210th trial, the skew and mean
of judgment distribution for this trial were subsequently combined
with the estimated parameters of (22) to yield the skew-corrected
judgment of D:
Dˆ210 = µD210 + βγ · γ210 + ϵ. (23)
Improving the accuracy of the mean was possible for all N∗
(Fig. 8(a), blue line). The estimated quadratic equation 5.17 −
0.16N∗ + 0.01N2∗ (F = 99.16, p < 0.0001) captures the relation
between elite group size and RMSE when the mean of judgments
across group members is corrected using information about
skewness. This quadratic is minimized at N∗ = 13.30, suggesting
that N∗ for groups who apply skew-correction is between thirteen
to fourteen people, given a talent pool reflecting the current
experiment. When v = 30 H pixels, and C = 3 (Fig. 8(b), blue
line), the AQ predicts the same general pattern based on 250
simulated experiments (Fig. 8(b), blue line). These predictions
relate to information contained in Section 5.6.
8. Discussion
Sir Francis Galton’s investigation (Galton, 1907b) into the
trustworthiness and peculiarities of popular judgment went far
beyond reporting the accuracy of common opinion, and remains
one of the most scholarly studies of collective intelligence. Galton
studied the entire distribution of judgments and realized any
meaningful explanation of its characteristics required knowledge
beyond statistics. The present study is part of continued effort
to understand how cognitive adaptation by individuals to their
environment shapes judgment distributions, and what that can
reveal about our brain and about our collective behavior.
Nash (2014) recently described a systematic error in the
wisdom of crowds, which judgment distribution skewness (JDS)
signals, and he speculated that information about skewness could
be used to correct errors before they cause damage. The present
article examined this possibility using findings froman experiment
where participants were asked to judge the area of circles.
Together people formed distributions of independent judg-
ments for each circle, and across these distributions, skewness
was found to signal deviation between areas and the mean of
guesses. This information was used to build an OLS model of such
differences, for the purpose of correcting errors on subsequent
trials. The endeavor was successful not only when judgments
were used indiscriminately for modeling, but also when estimates
by smaller, wiser crowds were isolated and applied exclusively.
The Augmented Quincunx (AQ), which models processes of noisy
signal detection, coupled with discrete and perfect evidence accu-
mulation, predicted these results via known, and unattended, psy-
chophysical effects. In short, with only one possible discrepancy
(see Section 7.6 for the exception) the AQ predicted an entire sys-
tem of psychophysical effects, uncovered an essential relation be-
tween cognitive and statistical principles governing the wisdom of
crowds, and guided the successful correction of errors arising from
the process it distills, under those circumstances it predicted.
8.1. Returning to Plymouth
By comparing Galton’s seminal study of weight estimation at
theWest of England Fat Stock andPoultry Exhibition, to the present
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Fig. 8. The performances of different sized elite groups: a. The performance of participants was evaluated using RMSE over 209 trials and CE of subgroups containing the
highest N∗ performers was subsequently recorded on the final trial. There are 210 possible final trials, and the average RMSE by the mean of judgments in different sized
elite subgroups is shown. Performance of the skew-corrected mean for different sized elite groups (thick blue line) outperformed the mean across all elite groups. b. Near
v = 30 H pixels and C = 3, the AQ predicts the same general pattern based on 250 simulated experiments involving 32 agents, whose p’s were estimated from the judgment
lines of actual participants using (13). The general result is robust to other settings of C and v, but when C is very low (top thin lines, C = 1, v = 90, and C = 2, v = 45) or
very high (bottom thin lines, C = 15, v = 6), the precision of predictions is inferior to the setting chosen. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
study of area estimation, numerous interesting and important
observations are revealed. The most relevant point for discussion
is the shape of the judgment distribution reported by Galton, and
his reaction to it. After revealing the distribution was negatively
skewed, Galton (1907b) remarked:
I have not sufficient knowledge of thementalmethods followed
by those who judge weights to offer a useful opinion as to
the cause of this curious anomaly. It is partly a psychological
question, in answering which the various psychophysical
investigations of Fechner and others would have to be taken
into account.
The judgment distribution observed by Galton was not curious
to him simply because it lacked symmetry, but because its skew-
ness was unusual. The scatter of guesses appeared to comprise two
sub-distributions, the first characterized by high variance around
an underestimating mean, and the second characterized by low
variance around an accurate mean.
This shape recently made (Wallis, 2014) suggests the distribu-
tion belonged to the family of two-piece distributions, which is
somethingGaltonmay have realized himself, given his reference to
Fechner,whohad described these ten years earlier (Fechner, 1897).
On the other hand, Galtonmay simply havementioned Fechner be-
cause he was familiar with his outstanding work onmagnitude es-
timation. In either case, Galton’s reference to psychophysics is, of
course, interesting in the present context.
The character of the judgment distribution described by Galton
is consistent with the idea that people in the crowd were either
completely novice, or highly expert at judging the weight of
livestock. Moreover, it is consistent with the idea they faced
an ox heavier than commonly experienced. To see why, first
consider the predicted and observed extent of noise around
judgment lines reported in the present paper, and the relation
of noise to predicted and observed judgment accuracy (Fig. 6).
The AQ predicts, and findings here and elsewhere (Cicchini et al.,
2012) suggest, that individuals with lower judgment ability have
judgment lines characterized by greater residual variance, which
supports the idea that novice weight judges formed the first sub-
distribution, while experts formed the other. Second, consider that
negative skewness in the judgment distribution was predicted
and reported in this paper to be associated with underestimation,
while underestimation was predicted and reported to occur
for magnitudes above the adaptation level. Last, but not least,
Galton’s own account supports these ideas; he informed his
readers the judgment distribution had negative skew, he reported
underestimation by themean judgment (Galton, 1907a), described
the exhibited ox as being fat, andmade the following remark about
the crowd:
The competitors included butchers and farmers, some of whom
were highly expert in judging the weight of cattle; others were
probably guided by such information as theymight pick up, and
by their own fancies.
We can extract two AQ parameters from Galton’s description
with relative ease. Fat implies excessive weight and, therefore,
d > 0, while values of p close to 0.5 and 1.0 capture novice
and expert judges respectively. The values of v and C , are more
uncertain, and we also lack information about the adaptation level
of weight judges, which is needed to convert their adjustment
from the adaptation level to an overall weight. Fortunately, the
GaltonArchive at University College, London, includesGalton’s 787
neatly transcribed weight estimates, and this information reveals
the mean of guesses was 1197.71 lb while the variance, skew, and
kurtosis of the judgment distribution were 5415.01, −0.41, and
6.01 respectively.
It turns out this arrangement of moments is reproduced most
accurately by the AQ when we assign novices and experts values
of p equal to 0.5 and 0.96 respectively, when C = 10, when
v = 40 lb, and when the adaptation level of judges is 1175 lb.
However, intriguingly, the AQ suggests a final detail, namely that
experts should outnumber novices substantially. Indeed, the best
reproduction of Galton’s observed distribution is achieved when
experts outnumber novices by 5 to 1. That is intriguing because
Galton’s opinion about the crowd received immediate criticism. In
a letter to the Editor of Nature, Perry-Coste (1907) wrote:
I do not think that Mr. Galton at all realises how large a
percentage of the [crowd] – the great majority, I should suspect
– [were] butchers, farmers, or men otherwise occupied with
cattle. To thesemen, the ability to estimate themeat-equivalent
weight of a living animal is an essential part of their business.
We have to deal with, not a vox populi, but a vox expertorum.
Of course, the relation between the proposed settings, and
what mechanisms actually generated the judgment distribution
at Plymouth, will never be known for certain, but the similarity
between what Galton observed and Fig. 9(b) is substantial. The
mean, variance, skew and kurtosis of the distribution reproduced
by the AQ are 1192, 5233,−0.41 and 6.30 respectively.
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Fig. 9. Reproducing Galton’s seminal observations using the AQ: a. The Galton Archive contains 787 transcribed estimates from the famous weight-guessing competition at
Plymouth. The mean guess was 1197.71 lb, 0.29 lb from the truth. The variance, skew, and kurtosis of the judgment distribution were 5415.01,−0.41, and 6.01 respectively.
b. When the crowd is assumed to have consisted of novice (p = 0.5) and expert judges (p = 0.96), and when experts outnumber novices by 5 to 1, then, if the weight of
the exhibited ox was inferred from 10 visible cues (C = 10), and the information content of each was 40 lb (v = 40), the AQ produces the shown distribution, with mean,
variance, skew and kurtosis of 1192, 5233,−0.41 and 6.30 respectively.
9. Conclusion
The wisdom of crowds is not merely an isolated statistical
phenomenon but an element of an entire system of patterns
related to the psychological process of magnitude estimation.
That is our conclusion based on the findings presented here. The
present article linked signal detection and evidence accumulation
to estimates of magnitude by individuals, and to the distribution
of estimated magnitudes that people produce alone, or together,
about aspects of their environment. We achieved this link by
harvesting predictions from the Augmented Quincunx (AQ), a
new sequential sampling model introduced by Nash (2014) that
distills neuronal mechanisms of Norm-Based coding to become
a probabilistic computer of judgments. Highlighting its strength,
the AQ not only predicts numerous known psychophysical
effects, including the central tendency of judgment, trial-to-trial
response variability by individuals, and individual heterogeneity
in judgment validity, but also predicts phenomena that have
received little attention so far. These phenomena include a positive
association between individual judgment validity and consistency,
and skewness of the distribution of estimates that individuals
generate alone when exposed to the same magnitude multiple
times, or together with others by submitting a single estimate
about one particular presented magnitude. By also predicting a
systematic error in the judgment distribution’s first moment, that
is to say, in the wisdom of the crowds effect, which correlates
with the predicted directed of skewness, the AQ ultimately guides
the successful correction of these errors before they might cause
damage to decision making. In short, the AQ not only confirms
Galton’s intuition about the role of psychophysics in explaining
his famous observation about Vox Populi in 1906, but also
contributes to psychophysics itself, and more generally, to our
knowledge of how individuals survive and achieve by measuring
their environment alone, and together with others.
Acknowledgment
This work was financed by the Danish government through
wages paid to the author in his role as Assistant Professor at
the Strategic Organization Design (SOD) unit, at the University of
Southern Denmark.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2017.01.001.
References
Berniker, M., Voss, M., & Kording, K. (2010). Learning priors for Bayesian
computations in the nervous system. PLoS One, 5(9), 1–9.
Bitzer, S., Park, H., Blankenburg, F., & Kiebel, S. J. (2014). Perceptual decisionmaking:
drift-diffusion model is equivalent to a Bayesian model. Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience, 8(February), 102.
Britten, K. H., Shadlen, M. N., Newsome, W. T., & Movshon, Ja (1992). The analysis
of visual motion: a comparison of neuronal and psychophysical performance.
The Journal of Neuroscience, 12(12), 4745–4765.
Brunswik, E. (1943). Organismic achievement and environmental probability.
Psychological Review, 50(3), 255–272.
Brunswik, E. (1956). Perception and the representative design of psychological
experiments. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Brunton, B. W., Botvinick, M. M., & Brody, C. D. (2013). Rats and humans can
optimally accumulate evidence for decision-making. Science, 340(6128), 95–98.
Cavonius, C. R., Hilz, R., & Chapman, R. M. (1974). A possible basis for individual
differences in magnitude estimation behaviour. British Journal of Psychology,
65(1), 85–91.
Cicchini, G. M., Arrighi, R., Cecchetti, L., Giusti, M., & Burr, D. C. (2012). Optimal
encoding of interval timing in expert percussionists. Journal of Neuroscience,
32(3), 1056–1060.
Faisal, aA, Selen, L. P. J., &Wolpert, D.M. (2008). Noise in the nervous system.Nature
Reviews Neuroscience, 9(4), 292–303.
Fechner, G.T. (1897). Kollectivmasslehre, Engleman, Engleman.
Forstmann, B. U., Ratcliff, R., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2016). Sequential sampling
models in cognitive neuroscience: Advantages, applications, and extensions.
Annual Review of Psychology, 67, 641–666.
Galton, F. (1894). Natural inheritance. Macmillan.
Galton, F. (1907a). The Ballot-Box. Nature Letters to Editor. p. 509.
Galton, F. (1907b). Vox populi. Nature, 75, 450–451.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models
of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103(4), 650–669. oct.
Gold, J. I., & Shadlen, M. N. (2007). The neural basis of decision making. Annual
Review of Neuroscience, 30(1), 535–574.
Goldstein, D.G., McAfee, R.P., & Suri, S. (2014). The wisdom of smaller, smarter
crowds. In Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on economics and
computation - EC’14 (pp. 471–488).
Green, D.M., & Luce, R. D. (1971). Detection of auditory signals presented at random
times: III. Perception & Psychophysics, 9(3), 257–268.
Green, D. M., & Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal detection theory and psychophysics, Vol. 1.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc..
Griffiths, T. L., Chater, N., Norris, D., & Pouget, A. (2012). How the Bayesians got their
beliefs (and what those beliefs actually are): Comment on Bowers and Davis
(2012). Psychological Bulletin, 138(3), 415–422.
Helson, H. (1947). Adaptation-level as frame of reference for prediction of
psychophysical data. The American Journal of Psychology, 60(1), 1–29.
Hoffman, P. J. (1960). The paramorphic representation of clinical judgment.
Psychological Bulletin, 57, 116–131.
Hollingworth, H. L. (1910). The central tendency of judgment. The Journal of
Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 461–469.
Kayaert, G., Biederman, I., Op De Beeck, H. P., & Vogels, R. (2005). Tuning for
shape dimensions in macaque inferior temporal cortex. European Journal of
Neuroscience, 22(1), 212–224.
LaBerge, D. (1962). A recruitment theory of simple behavior. Psychometrika, 27(4),
375–396.
Laplace, P.S. (1812). Theorie analytique des probabilites, Paris, Ve Courcier.
Latimer, K. W., Yates, J. L., Meister, M. L., Huk, A. C., & Pillow, J. W. (2015). Single-
trial spike trains in parietal cortex reveal discrete steps during decision-making.
Science, 349(6244), 184–187.
U.W. Nash / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 77 (2017) 165–179 179
Latinus, M., McAleer, P., Bestelmeyer, P. E. G., & Belin, P. (2013). Norm-based coding
of voice identity in human auditory cortex. Current Biology, 23(12), 1075–1080.
Leopold, Da, Bondar, I. V., & Giese, Ma (2006). Norm-based face encoding by single
neurons in the monkey inferotemporal cortex. Nature, 442(7102), 572–575.
Loffler, G., Yourganov, G., Wilkinson, F., & Wilson, H. R. (2005). fMRI evidence for
the neural representation of faces. Nature Neuroscience, 8(10), 1386–1390.
Lorenz, J., Rauhut, H., Schweitzer, F., & Helbing, D. (2011). How social influence can
undermine the wisdom of crowd effect. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America, 108(22), 9020–9025.
Luce, R. D. (1972). What sort of measurement is psychophysical measurement? The
American Psychologist , 27(2), 96–106.
Luce, R. D., & Mo, S. S. (1965). Magnitude estimation of heaviness and loudness by
individual subjects: A test of a probabilistic response theory. British Journal of
Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 18(2), 159–174.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into the human represen-
tation and processing of visual information. Phenomenology and the Cognitive
Sciences, 8(4), 397.
Morgan, M. J., Watamaniuk, S. N. J., & McKee, S. P. (2000). The use of an implicit
standard for measuring discrimination thresholds. Vision Research, 40(17),
109–117.
Muchnik, L., Aral, S., & Taylor, S. J. (2013). Social influence bias: a randomized
experiment. Science (New York, NY), 341(6146), 647–651.
Muth, J. F. (1961). Rational expectations and the theory of price movements.
Econometrica, 29(3), 315–335.
Nash, U. W. (2014). The curious anomaly of skewed judgment distributions and
systematic error in the wisdom of crowds. PLoS One, 9(11), e112386.
Newsome, William T., Britten, K. H., & Anthony Movshon, J. (1989). Neural
correlates of a perceptual decision. Nature, 341(6237), 52–54.
Perry-Coste, F.H. (1907). The Ballot-Box. Nature Letters to Editor. (March 28), p. 509.
Pike, R. (1973). Response latency models for signal detection. Psychological Review,
80(1), 53–68.
Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review, 85(2),
59–108.
Rhodes, G., Robbins, R., Jaquet, E., McKone, E., Jeffery, L., & Clifford, C. W. G. (2005).
Adaptation and face perception: How aftereffects implicate norm-based coding
of faces. In Fitting the mind to the world: Adaptation and after-effects in high-level
vision (pp. 213–235). Oxford University Press.
Roitman, J. D., & Shadlen, M. N. (2002). Response of neurons in the lateral
intraparietal area during a combined visual discrimination reaction time task.
Journal of Neuroscience, 22(21), 9475–9489.
Shadlen, M. N., & Newsome, W. T. (2001). Neural basis of a perceptual decision in
the parietal cortex (area LIP) of the rhesus monkey. Journal of Neurophysiology,
86(4), 1916–1936.
Simons, A. M. (2004). Many wrongs: The advantage of group navigation. Trends in
Ecology and Evolution, 19(9), 453–455.
Stevens, S. S., & Greenbaum, H. B. (1966). Regression effect in psychophysical
judgment. Perception & Psychophysics, 439–446.
Stocker, Aa, & Simoncelli, E. P. (2006). Noise characteristics and prior expectations
in human visual speed perception. Nature Neuroscience, 9(4), 578–585.
Surowiecki, J. (2004). The wisdom of crowds: Why the many are smarter than the
few and how collective wisdom shapes business, economies, societies and nations.
Doubleday.
Thurstone, L. L. (1927). Psychophysical analysis. American Journal of Psychology, 38,
368.
Tolman, E. C., & Brunswik, E. (1935). The organism and the causal texture of the
environment. Psychological Review, 42(1), 43–77.
Townsend, J. T., & Ashby, F. G. (1983). Stochastic modeling of elementary
psychological processes. The American Journal of Psychology, 480.
Vickers, D. (1970). Evidence for an accumulator model of psychophysical
discrimination. Ergonomics, 13(1), 37–58.
Vul, E., & Pashler, H. (2008). Measuring the crowd within: Probabilistic
representations within individuals. Psychological Science, 19(7), 645–647.
Wagenmakers, E. J., & Brown, S. (2007). On the linear relation between themean and
the standard deviation of a response time distribution. Psychological Review,
114(3), 830–841.
Wallis, K. F. (2014). Revisiting Francis Galton’s forecasting competition. Statistical
Science, 29(3), 420–424.
Yang, T., & Shadlen, M. N. (2007). Probabilistic reasoning by neurons. Nature,
447(7148), 1075–1080.
